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KEYNOTE SPEECH
JULIUS

L. CHAMBERS*

Thank you very much, and good afternoon to all of the partici
pants in this interestingly named People of Color Conference. I am
somewhat apprehensive about using the term "color" today since it
is no longer considered an appropriate word to use. It is good that
we are meeting to talk about a subject that I have been connected
with for many years. A group of students came up to me the other
day and said, "You're advocating diversity of this black school and
we are pulling together a petition to demand your resignation."
And I said, "Do you need any help?" It was interesting because
they didn't even bring the petition back to me after they finished.
Being a college chancellor, a president, is a lot of fun, but I had a lot
more fun litigating cases.
I was asked to talk for a few minutes about the status of civil
rights in the 1990s. Additionally, I presume that I was supposed to
look into my little crystal ball and talk about civil rights in the fu
ture. After thirty-five years of litigation in civil rights, I should be
overly optimistic about the progress we have made. After all, I
have rejoiced with many decisions of the Supreme Court which di
rected improved opportunities for African-Americans in education,
employment, housing, and health care. Occasionally, I have even
rejoiced with the decisions of the Court in the areas of criminal law
and voting rights. Indeed, we watched African-Americans move
from segregated and inferior schools to better jobs, to better hous
ing, and, now, to more than forty African-Americans in our highest
legislative chamber. Why shouldn't we then rejoice at our progress,
at the present status of civil rights, and even at the future of civil
rights?
Developments since the mid-1970s have raised a frightening
cloud on my optimism regarding civil rights. As the years have
passed, we have become even more concerned about the progress
of the past, and, in some cases, about whether that was really pro
* Chancellor, North Carolina Central University. B.A., 1958, North Carolina
Central University; M.A., 1959, University of Michigan; LL.B., 1962, University of
North Carolina School of Law; LL.M., 1963, Columbia University School of Law.
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gress at all. Before I continue, let me make clear that I believe we
have made progress, substantial progress. However, I have some
concerns, and they are appropriate concerns.
The changes written into our Constitution and into federal and
state laws will never permit this country to return to the status of
civil rights as it existed in the nineteenth century or the early part of
the twentieth century. However, the trends that are apparent in
more recent Supreme Court decisions, in Congress and in many of
our state capitals are placing us in a kind of twilight zone of half
free and half-enslaved.
That is not an exaggerated characterization when we look at
the nation's poor. I had hope, with Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen
burg Board of Education,l that we were at least writing an end to
the segregated public schools as we had known them, and Keyes v.
School District No. ]2 opened up even more possibilities than
Brown v. Board of Education,3 and Swann would be applied na
tionwide. Milliken v. Bradley,4 in Detroit, and San Antonio In
dependent School District v. Rodriguez,s. in Texas, however,
dampened our optimism. Brown would only be applied where
schools were intentionally and purposely segregated by state action,
and only within the confines of clearly established districts. No re
lief would be accorded where only poverty was to be the determin
ing factor, placing children at a disadvantage, and that was true
even though our poor, our minority poor, would suffer dispropor
tionately. These decisions foreclose the possibility of many children
even enjoying the benefits of Brown. They would remain in segre
gated and inferior schools with no constitutional relief.
Events in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Dekalb County, Geor
gia, Norfolk, Virginia, and Austin, Texas, made clear that the relief
we had obtained after thirty-something years of litigation was only
temporary. We watched with dismay as school district after school
district abandoned these desegregation plans and returned to segre
gated schools. Norfolk, Oklahoma City, Austin, and Dekalb
County are now as segregated as they were before Brown, with the
exception of perhaps some mixing of teachers and administrative
personnel. The same is true in many other school districts across
the South and North that were desegregated during the 1960s and
1.
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1970s. What do you tell an African-American child today who
wants a better education? Is there any basis for that child to be
lieve that the Constitution provides protection for him, just as it
provides protection for a white kid across town?
If we extend Brown to higher education then the problem is
equally dismal. Decisions leading up to Brown made clear that seg
regation in higher education would not be tolerated. In Mississippi,
we were assured that Brown would indeed be applied in higher ed
ucation. 6 States with formerly segregated colleges and universities
began to l()ok again at the Court's interpretation of the Constitu
tion. But, here again, the bark was worse than the bite. Black chil
dren in Mississippi now face the possibility that they will never get a
chance to complete a college degree. They, therefore, question
whether Brown really provided any relief for them or whether it
was simply an obstacle in their path to freedom.
The latest ruling in Mississippi directs historically black institu
tions to increase their white enrollment.? Five million dollars has
been allocated for each black school for this purpose with no simi
lar allocation for black children to attend any school. No directive
was issued to the white schools to increase their minority enroll
ment. All schools will apparently have to adopt the same admission
standards, despite the fact that the standards now being applied will
disproportionately exclude eighty percent of black children.
In Alabama, black colleges and universities were condemned
by the court because they had, as the court saw it, so few white
students. 8 But nothing was said about the University of Alabama
or Auburn. In Florida and North Carolina, state legislators are seri
ously considering eliminating funding of remedial programs in four
year institutions, and now in junior and community colleges as well.
Where is the poor kid who can't pass the test to get into a four-year
college going to go to college? The answer: Who cares? Moreover,
in Texas, as well as California and across the nation, race based
admission programs and scholarships are condemned as reverse dis
crimination. We are completing a cycle from segregated schools, to
no school, to no education. This is not a pretty picture and certainly
not one that permits us to rejoice today.
In employment, the scenario is practically the same. I will
6. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
7. See Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. Miss. 1995), affd, 99 F.3d 1136
(5th Cir. 1996).
8. See Knight v. Alabama, 801 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (holding revised
admissions policy acceptable).
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never forget the time consuming and arduous process we followed
in trying to implement Title VTI,9 Title VI,lO and Section 1981.1 1
That was" at first, protracted litigation with procedural issues fol
lowed by the more difficult task of giving meaning to the substan
tive provisions of Title VII. With Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 12 and
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moodyp and many other cases like that,
we were able to establish how a victim of discrimination could get
into court. We later were able to establish what a victim needed to
prove in order to obtain relief. 14 Finally, we were able to establish
what kind of relief would be appropriate once discrimination was
established.1 5 We didn't anticipate the vigorous assault that would
be made against the standards for establishing liability or the appro
priateness of the relief the court had been directing.
We thought Griggs had established a precedent that would be
applied across the board. We thought that the relief that had been
accorded in many Title VII cases for injunctive relief, back pay, or
damages would be the best way for ruling out discrimination in em
ployment across this country. We did not anticipate our Supreme
Court ruling that Title VII, Section 1981, and Title VI would be
interpreted the same way as the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, despite the fact that these statutes were
supposedly remedial legislation. We also did not anticipate the
enormous and persistent assault on affirmative action and race
based remedies. With the 1989 decisions of the Supreme Court in
City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co. ,16 Price Waterhouse v. Hop
kinsp Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia,I8 and Martin v. Wilks,19
the Court basically completed a judicial repeal of Title VII by fiat.
The Court skewed procedural rules that we had laboriously estab
lished. The Court rejected the standards we hfld established in a
number of cases on how one proves liability. The Court rejected
the limited relief that had been directed in cases for many years. In
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
10. §§ 2000d-2000d-7.
11. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1994).
12. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
14. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977); Moody, 422 U.S. 405; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 347-48.
16. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
17. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
18. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
19. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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Atonia, the majority of the Court simply ignored history and stare

decisis. Nothing that Justice White could say in concurrence would
eliminate the fact that this majority of the Court simply rejected
precedent on how one establishes liability. Congress made a feeble
attempt in 1991 to restore some meaning to Title VII and to Section
1981. Procedurally, victims of employment discrimination may be
able to establish some liability, but they face enormous hurdles in
trying to do so.
That plight has been made even more difficult with the way
that we have interpreted Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro
cedure. Anybody running into court these days with a civil rights
claim may face a judge who doesn't like civil rights and who readily
imposes sanctions to keep you out of his court. I know. I've got a
$90,000 award against me to show for it. Civil rights lawyers across
this country are now very apprehensive about going to court to liti
gate a civil rights claim.
Recent decisions in the voting rights area have been equally
ominous. The 1982 amendments to the Constitution and to the
Voting Rights Act were designed to put an end to the exclusion of
minorities from the electoral process. Moreover, Congress sought,
we thought, to ensure that minorities would have, at last, a mean
ingful vote and would be able to vote and elect a representative of
choice. We fought vigorously with the Legal Defense Fund for
favorable interpretation of the 1982 amendments and we had much
success. We watched, together with the Joint Center for Political
and Economic Studies, as the number of minorities in elected posi
tions increased substantially. Now, in 1996, we have over forty Af
rican-Americans and many other minorities elected to Congress
and able to playa role in preserving the rights of our people.
We are now witnessing, however, an assault on the Voting
Rights Act. I tell you, today my fear is that the Court will re-write
the Voting Rights Act just like it re-wrote Title VII, and we may
watch the number of minorities and African-Americans in Con
gress dwindle from the forty who are there now to twenty or less.
We already know that with the decisions of the Court in Shaw v.
Reno,2° there is a determined assault on local and state districts
which sought to insure effective minority participation in state and
city or local government. I argued Shaw v. Hunt,21 a North Caro
lina re-districting case, in December, and was really amazed at the
20.
21.

509 U.S. 630 (1993).
116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
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tenor of the Court. I was even more amazed reading some of the
decisions of the Court in reacting to Thornburg v. Gingles ,22 and
other voting rights cases. I don't know what the Court is going to
do with the North Carolina and the Texas cases,23 which were ar
gued the same day, but it is appalling to me that we would be argu
ing this issue before the Court today. Is it unconstitutional to draw
minority districts for Hispanic and African-Americans, but okay to
draw districts for majority people? Why are we even arguing the
issue? This question was raised with Justice O'Connor who vigor
ously denied that that is what she intended to do. We'll see. We'll
see in Texas. We'll see in North Carolina. But we have seen it al
ready in Georgia. In Georgia and Louisiana, the Court has rejected
majority/minority districts and we are now losing legislators by the
numbers.
It is clear that despite the barriers we have raised for African
Americans and other minorities in the voting rights area, if we pro
vide some kind of relief, we can expect them to get involved and
help determine their own future. Using these three areas-educa
tion, employment and voting rights-one can conclude that civil
rights today isn't where we would like to see it; but contrary to what
some of my friends believe, civil rights isn't dead.
I would like to raise with you some of the concerns I have
about the future and some steps I hope you will take to help us
ensure a better America for all people. From the vantage point of
director counsel of the NAACP, Legal Defense Fund, and now a
Chancellor of an historically black college, I have watched as
America slowly began to appreciate that there are many races and
ethnic groups in this country. We have previously viewed America
in terms of black and white, but there are Hispanics and Asians and
Native Americans and many other divisions, all of them yearning
for an equal chance in life. Race continues to disadvantage Afri
can-Americans and, as Dr. John Hope Franklin tells us, it will con
tinue to do so through the twenty-first century and prob~bly even
beyond. 24
I believe that African-Americans and other minorities must
begin to think of relief in terms of the opportunities provided for all
people. We must ensure that everybody will be able to enjoy the
benefits we are trying to obtain for ourselves. For example, there
22.
23.
24.

478 U.S. 30 (1986).
See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE COLOR LINE (1994).
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are 24% Hispanic people in New York, and 26% African-Ameri
cans. We haven't yet been able to develop relief that would ensure
that Hispanics in New York would have an equal and fair chance to
elect congressional representatives of choice. How do we justify
four African-American congressmen and one Hispanic?
I can carry this example even to California, to Texas, and to
Chicago, because we are involved in a fight, and I understand the
sensitivities of people. I understand the legitimacy of the aspira
tions of all people. I sincerely believe that part of the problein we
are encountering today is because we have not yet focused on a
remedy with broad appeal that would ensure that all people enjoy
the benefits that we are seeking for ourselves.
I was involved with affirmative action employment litigation in
Chicago, and we had a major problem trying to figure out what
kinds of goals we could set, not only for African-Americans, but
also for Hispanics and women. Many people feared that if we in
cluded goals for women we would defeat opportunities for African
Americans. That fight unfortunately is still going on.
Moreover, some of us question whether integration has been
good or bad. I hear the argument. And people make a good argu
ment, at times, that we lost something in trying to integrate the pub
lic schools. They do not remember, as I do, what segregation was
like in the 1930s, 40s, 50s, and 60s. They don't remember, or maybe
do not care to remember, what it was like trying to ensure that even
African-Americans would be able to get a better educational
opportunity.
During the past two weeks, students at my college, North Car
olina Central in Durham, have argued that our historically black
university should not actively recruit white students. We have a cul
tural heritage they tell me we must preserve. And we must remain
majority if not all black. I have taken a firm position that this
school, our school, is one that must be open to all people' and we
are going to recruit everybody to that institution. We are going to
develop an academic program that we think will be second to none
and everybody is going to want to go there. With today's market
and with today's budget, nobody can maintain an all black, an all
white, an all Hispanic, an all Asian anything that is publicly sup
ported. At the same time, I strongly advocate that, as an integrated
institution, we can admit and support individuals and students and
promote their cultural heritages.
I was at a meeting yesterday and we were discussing Clarence
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Page's recent book.25 I don't know if you read it, but you might if
you get a chance. A question was posed that was really interesting
and I don't know if you really thought about that much yourself.
What do you think society would look like if it was truly colorblind?
What do you think the world would look like if we integrated our
institutions and programs? Would we eliminate racial identities of
various programs within that society? Then the question was put
maybe we've already reached the millennium of a colorblind soci
ety. Maybe we reached the beginning of that kind of society. I
raise this question because I think that, as we talk about the civil
rights of the future, we have to help define the kind of world we are
seeking. We haven't done that, none of us, neither you nor I.
I don't know how we can blame the Supreme Court for having
trouble today in trying to decide the type of relief to accord. I was
arguing a case in court three or four years ago and a Justice asked
me, "Are you sure this is the kind of relief you want? Have you
thought about it? What kind of school do you want? What kind of
voting district do you want? What kind of job opportunity do you
want?" We haven't formulated the answers to these questions. Not
in the sense that we are guaranteeing that all people, men and wo
men, black and white, will be accorded equal protection. It's a seri
ous challenge.
Nor have we, unfortunately, reached out to ensure protection
for the poor. I've been disturbed for the last fifteen years with Rod
riguez 26 and how little all of us have done to convince the court that
Justice Powell was simply wrong. Why don't we have a Brown v.
Board,27 that overrides Rodriguez and guarantees that every person
is entitled to equal protection, whatever his or her economic status?
The time has come to focus our efforts and energies to resolve these
crucial issues. Only by defining our goals can we hope to attain
them.

25.
AMERICA

26.
27.

See CLARENCE PAGE, SHOWING My COLOR: IMPOLITE ESSAYS
(1996).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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